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The performance of Portuguese banks under Basel III: How have the new 
capital requirements impacted the profitability of Portuguese banks? 
 
Abstract 
 
This Dissertation analyzes how the new capital requirements imposed by Basel III framework 
affected the profitability of Portuguese banks, during and after the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC). The present Dissertation employs the Multiple Regression analysis to study how 
Common Equity Tier 1, Tier 1 and Total Capital movements, could affect the Return on Equity 
and Return on Assets of Portuguese banks. This research collected some relevant empirical 
findings from the estimated regressions. This research’s findings suggest that there is a negative 
relationship between Common Equity Tier 1 and Return on Equity, and that Tier 1 and Total 
Capital contributes positively to the increase of profitability. Moreover, Common Equity Tier 
1 presents coefficients with higher magnitude comparing with the other capital ratios, having 
a greater impact on Portuguese banks’ profitability. Finally, higher capital ratios affect the 
credit channel in the Portuguese banking sector and could impact the profitability of Portuguese 
banks. 
 
Esta Dissertação analisa a forma como os novos requisitos de capital impostos pelo acordo de 
Basileia III afetaram a rentabilidade dos bancos portugueses, durante e após a Crise Financeira 
Global. A presente Dissertação desenvolve uma análise de Regressão Múltipla para averiguar 
como os movimentos no Common Equity Tier 1, Tier 1 e Total Capital puderam afetar o retorno 
sobre o patrimonio líquido e o retorno sobre os ativos dos bancos Portugueses. Esta Dissertação 
alcançou vários resultados empíricos relevantes, com base nas regressões estimadas. Esta 
Dissertação conclui que existe uma relação negativa entre o Common Equity Tier 1 e o retorno 
sobre o patrimonio líquido, bem como que o Tier 1 e o Total Capital contribuem positivamente 
para o aumento da rentabilidade. Além disso, o Common Equity Tier 1 apresenta coeficientes 
com maior magnitude em comparação com os outros rácios de capital, tendo maior impacto 
sobre a rentabilidade. Finalmente, o aumento dos rácios de capital afetam o canal de crédito no 
setor bancário nacional e podem afetar a rentabilidade dos bancos portugueses. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Growth and profitability are the goals of every financial institution. However, with the 
increasing pace of regulatory change, the renewed regulatory vigilance and higher stakeholder 
expectations in a post-crisis environment, it becomes even harder for banks to be profitable. 
One of the involvements of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) after the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) - due to the severity of international financial contagion processes in 
financial institutions that ultimately affected the global economy - was the Basel III framework. 
According to BIS (2011), “the objective of the reforms is to improve the banking sector’s 
ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress, whatever the source, thus 
reducing the risk of spill over from the financial sector to the real economy”(BIS, 2010: p.1). 
The aim of this Dissertation is to study how the new capital requirements imposed by the BIS 
could affect the profitability of major Portuguese banks. Regarding the capital requirements, 
this Dissertation will focus on the Common Equity Tier 1 Capital, the Tier 1 Capital and Total 
Capital. In relation to Portuguese banks, this research focuses on the impact of those new 
capital requirements on five (5) major banks: Caixa Geral de Depósitos, Santander Totta, 
Banco Português de Investimentos, Millennium BCP and Montepio. This is a very important 
research topic for four main reasons. First, it is an excellent opportunity to find what is the 
performance of profitability metrics (namely, the ROE and ROA) of the Portuguese banks. 
Second, to address the recent shocks in the Portuguese economy, (for instance, the sovereign 
debt crisis), which resulted in the increasing of regulatory compliance due to the Global 
Financial Crisis and the numerous recapitalizations and resolutions in the banking sector. 
Third, to address and increase the relevant literature about this academic research topic for 
financial institutions, because there is a lack of literature about this academic research topic at 
an empirical level, more precisely on the Portuguese banking sector. Fourth, considering that 
banks must comply with these new requirements, it is crucial to understand how those increases 
on capital could affect their business activities, and how they can make the most of those 
requirements, especially in the context of a more invigorated financial stability framework. 
The academic literature has mainly focused on the origins of the Global Financial Crisis of 
2008 and on the reasons, that led to the implementation of Basel III.  Also, how the increasing 
levels of regulation could prevent future crises, protect society, and make financial institutions 
grow safely by being more prepared against economic shocks. There is some academic 
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literature concerning the impacts of increasing regulation on banks’ performance and how they 
have adjusted to the new capital ratios, which have suffered a huge transformation since the 
beginning of Basel III implementation. Some literature about loan supply in the European 
markets, and how the lending rates will fluctuate under Basel III framework is also observed. 
The present Dissertation employs Multiple Regression analysis to study how capital 
movements could affect the profitability of Portuguese banks. The data used in this Dissertation 
were taken from banks’ balance sheet through a time window from 2007 to 2016. The variables 
used to compute the regression analysis could be divided in two types, the dependent variables 
and the independent variables. The former includes the profitability indicators, more precisely, 
the ROE and ROA. While the latter includes the Common Equity Tier 1, Tier 1 Capital and 
Total Capital.  
Regarding the empirical findings, the present Dissertation suggests that high capital levels on 
banks’ balance sheets contribute to the decreasing of the credit channel in the banking sector. 
The amount of loans will decrease, due to the impact on the credit channel, and the number of 
defaults by customers will increase substantially. The Non-Performing Loans will maintain 
their growth tendency demonstrated since 2006 and consequently increase banks’ provisions. 
Also, according to the estimated regressions, the Common Equity Tier 1 has a strong negative 
impact on the profitability of Santander, Millennium BCP and BPI. Overall, it is possible to 
conclude that there is a negative relationship between the increased capital requirements and 
profitability.  
Following this brief overview about the present Dissertation, the contextualizing chapter 
(Section 2) pays attention to the Global Financial Crisis.  Also, it provides a general overview 
of the Basel III framework and describes the evolution of the banking sector in Portugal. 
Section 3 addresses the relevant literature review. Section 4 focuses on the methodology and 
data used to compute the regressions, with the main goal of achieving relevant empirical 
results. Section 5 presents the Dissertation’s empirical findings. This chapter describes the 
main findings and provide the explanations for the profitability performance in the banking 
sector. Finally, section 6 presents the main conclusions with a detailed summary of the topics 
addressed by this fundamental academic research question. 
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2. Contextualization Chapter 
 
The Global Financial Crisis is essentially associated with the “deflating of a speculative bubble 
in the housing market that began in the United States in 2006 and has now cascaded across 
many other countries in the form of financial failures and a global credit crunch”(Shiller, 2008: 
p.9). 
Bessis (2015) states that “in the United States, after assisting in the bail-out of some large 
ﬁnancial ﬁrms, the ﬁnancial authorities let Lehman Brothers down in 2008, [a moment] which 
is considered as the critical event in the development of the ﬁnancial crisis.” (Bessis, 2015: 
p.14). With this, a very important question arises, namely, what were the main determinants 
leading to the Global Financial Crisis? 
Hull (2009), defends that the lack of self-regulation revealed by financial institutions, the lax 
mortgage lending practices, the housing bubble created by the securitization process, and the 
inappropriate information provided by rating agencies, were the main reasons that led to the 
Global Financial Crisis.   
The Global Financial Crisis started in the United States but soon spread worldwide, and 
Portugal was no exception. According to Saunders (2014), the European crisis was so deep that 
“the U.S. banks had sovereign risk exposure (…) to Portugal [which] totalled $47.1 billion.” 
(Saunders, 2014: P.62). 
International financial contagion processes among financial institutions typically explain the 
propagation of the systemic shock throughout the global banking industry (Bhimjee, et al. 
2016), leading to a global crisis that affected almost all economies on a global scale. (Bhimjee 
et al., 2013) further defends that the contagion process was the main determinant for the huge 
change in public debt levels of Euro Area Member States. Even the economies that were 
growing exponentially faced huge slowdowns: “China’s booming economy slowed more than 
had been predicted, from 10.1 percent in the second quarter of 2008 to 9 percent in the third 
quarter.” (Saunders, 2014: p.61). 
Regarding the huge impact on the global economy due to the lack of regulation, and in order 
to control for inflation and to contribute to global financial stability, the Bank for International 
Settlements implemented the third framework of the Basel accord. These new regulatory efforts 
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are aimed at strengthening banks’ capital framework, in comparison to the precepts established 
in Basel II, as can be observed in the following table: 
 Capital Requirements 
 Common Equity Tier 1 Tier 1 Capital Total Capital 
 Minimum Conservation Buffer Required Minimum Required Minimum Required 
Basel II 2 - - 4 - 8 - 
Basel III 4.5 2.5 7 6 8.5 8 10.5 
 
Table 1 - Capital Requirements imposed by Basel II and Basel III 
Source: Bank for International Settlements, 2010 
 
In addition to the Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) requirements, there were structural changes in 
the capital requirements framework, namely, new capital definitions, new buffers, the 
implementation of the leverage ratio and the concept of systematic risk. One of the most 
important features of this deep regulatory change is the implementation of a conservation buffer 
of 2.5%. "If [bank] capital is high enough to absorb large losses, the banks would be safe. The 
size of the capital base depends on how much risk banks are taking.” (Bessis, 2015: p.14). But 
how could this new set of capital requirements contribute to the strengthening of the capital 
framework in the banking sector? What are the main goals of the Basel III framework?  
According to Basel Committee On Banking Supervision (2011), there are 5 specific goals that 
Basel III aims to achieve. The first goal is to increase the consistency, quality, and transparency 
of banks’ capital in order to guarantee that the financial institutions are prepared to absorb 
financial losses in the case an extreme financial event occurs. Secondly, it is important to 
strengthen the risk coverage of banks’ capital by safeguarding capital requirements against 
securitization processes, counterparty credit risk, banks exposures to central counterparties 
(CCPs), and counterparty credit risk exposures. Thirdly, the concept of leverage ratio was 
introduced as a supplementary measure to the Basel risk-based capital.  The fourth goal passes 
through the implementation of countercyclical buffers which reduce the procyclicality of 
shocks in the banking system. Finally, the fifth goal addresses the implementation of some 
liquidity standards for banking institutions, for instance, the liquidity coverage ratio, the net 
stable funding ratio, and supervisory monitoring, in order to identify major disruptions in 
liquidity risks.  
Accordingly, Portuguese banks were subject to these new requirements imposed by Basel III. 
However, the Portuguese banking sector was affected by the innumerable recapitalizations and 
resolutions after the financial crisis. For instance, 2012 was marked by the recapitalization of 
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Caixa Geral de Depósitos, Banco Português de Investimento, and Millennium BCP. Also, 2014 
was marked by the intervention of 4.3 thousand million euros of public help with the creation 
of Novo Banco. Very recently, in 2017, the Millennium BCP increased its capital by 1.3 
thousand million euros. 
According to Associação Portuguesa de Bancos (2016), the Portuguese banking sector had an 
amount of €386 thousand million in total assets, collectively providing €234.6 thousand million 
in loans to their customers and receiving 245.4 thousand million euros in deposits from 
customers. Through the following Figures, it is possible to scrutinize the evolution of the 
amount of assets, credit, and deposits for the five (5) major Portuguese banks that are being 
addressed by the present Dissertation, for the time frame 2009 - 2016 (Figure 1 below). 
 
 
Figure 1 - Amount of assets per bank as a percentage of total assets. 
Source of data: Associação Portuguesa de Bancos (2016) 
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Figure 2 - Amount of Loans to customers per bank as a percentage of total loans. 
Source of data: Associação Portuguesa de Bancos (2016) 
 
 
Figure 3 - Amount of Deposits per bank as a percentage of total deposits. 
Source of data: Associação Portuguesa de Bancos (2016) 
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Collectively, the said 5 major Portuguese banks hold 76% of the assets in the Portuguese 
banking sector, provide 80% of the loans and receive 81% of the deposits (values for the year 
2016). It is important to mention that, in 2014, the Portuguese banking industry (as observed 
by the four major Portuguese financial institutions) increased the soundness of their financial 
indicators, because of the resolution of Banco Espirito Santo. Due to that event, the indicators 
referring to this bank were not incorporated in the total calculation of assets, credit, and 
deposits. There is a specific increase in the figures above for 2014 because, when calculating 
the credit, assets, and deposits for the Portuguese banking sector, Novo Banco was not 
incorporated in the estimations and for this reason, the share of these 5 banks is higher. Caixa 
Geral de Depósitos has always been the biggest bank in Portugal while Millennium BCP is the 
top private bank until 2016.  
With that said, an important question arises: How are these indicators distributed by different 
banks, mainly the ones that are being addressed by the present Dissertation? According to 
Rhoades (1993), the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) represents a statistical measure of 
concentration and measures the dimension of different financial institutions in relation to the 
industry, in this case, the banking industry. In order to analyse the behaviour of this index since 
the beginning of the financial crisis, the concentration levels of the credit, assets, and deposits 
for the Portuguese banking sector were estimated, through the following formula1: 
HHI = ∑ (𝑀𝑆𝑖)2
n
i=1
                                                       (1)                                                                        
• n = number of banks 
• MS = Market Share 
• 𝑖 = Bank 𝑖 
The formula above could be computed by squaring the Market Shares of the Portuguese banks 
and then summing the respective squares. The existence of monopoly power in the banking 
system will be expressed by an HHI equal to 1. The following table demonstrates the levels of 
this Index according to assets, credit, and deposits: 
 
                                                          
1 Bikker, J. A. and Haaf, K. (2002) Measures of Competition and Concentration in the Banking Industry: 
a Review of the Literature. 
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 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)  
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Assets 0.115 0.113 0.115 0.113 0.119 0.174 0.137 0.140 
Credit 0.125 0.122 0.126 0.130 0.131 0.195 0.159 0.160 
Deposits 0.156 0.143 0.147 0.151 0.146 0.206 0.173 0.173 
 
Table 2 - Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for the 5 Portuguese banks since 2009 until 2016 
Source of data: Associação Portuguesa de Bancos (2016) 
 
According to table 2, the HHI is considered to have a mild level of concentration, also, a growth 
trend in all indicators can be noted. For assets and credit, the Portuguese banking sector 
presents low levels of concentration, and for deposits, is considered to have a moderate 
concentration, insofar as, in most of the years, the value of the index is higher than 0.15. These 
findings might be attributed to the fact that Caixa Geral de Depósitos and Millennium BCP 
have received, during the 8 years associated with the time frame adopted by the present 
Dissertation, approximately 50% of the deposits made by customers. 
The Portuguese banking sector has faced a severe financial crisis and has witnessed many 
changes in the sector. In addition, the Bank for International Settlements imposed new capital 
requirements for the Portuguese banks. The present Dissertation will analyse how those new 
capital requirements could affect the profitability of the Portuguese banking sector. 
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3. Literature Review 
 
The main goal of the present chapter is to analyse the essential academic literature sources 
associated with the research topic addressing the BASEL III framework. The main goals of this 
Dissertation are: i) to understand what were the main reasons for the design and implementation 
of the BASEL III accord; and ii) how this accord could affect the performance of Portuguese 
banks, mainly where banks’ profitability is concerned.  This chapter of the literature review is 
organized in descending order of importance. 
According to Basel Committee On Banking Supervision (2011), the goal of the latest 
improvement on the Basel framework is to improve banks’ ability to absorb shocks arising 
from economic and financial stress and prevent future crises. This white paper presents the 5 
goals of the Basel III framework, as well as the calculation method of Common Equity Tier 1 
Capital, Tier 1 Capital, Total Capital and capital buffers, for instance, conservation and 
countercyclical buffer. However, there are several negative consequences associated with this 
new capital requirement framework. 
First of all, it is very important to return to the origin of the problem that contributed to the 
implementation of this agreement, the credit crisis. Hull (2009) presents the main events that 
contributed to the credit crisis of 2007. This article focuses on the origins of the crisis and tries 
to demonstrate that the US housing market, the several levels of securitization, and the rating 
agencies were the main determinants for the U.S. subprime crisis. Hull (2009) concludes that 
the credit crisis could be explained by the very low interest rate environment (lax monetary 
policy) between 2002 and 2005, the relaxed lending standards and low risk aversion, as well 
as sophisticated financial innovation processes (as represented by the growing volume of the 
subprime mortgage lending). In addition, the author also states that to avoid future crises, the 
financial institutions should disincentive the compensation plans produced by short-term 
performance and increase the transparency of the financial products promoted by banks. 
Due to the lack of financial regulation demonstrated in the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis, the Bank for International Settlements, implemented the third regulatory framework of 
the Basel accords. This accord’s main goal is to reduce the probability and severity of future 
crises (BIS, 2011). Considering that the execution of BASEL III and the corresponding 
procedures must be fully implemented by the beginning of 2019, a very pertinent academic 
10 
 
research question arises: How do the new capital requirements imposed by the Basel III 
framework affect the profitability of the Portuguese Banks? 
Hannoun (2010) demonstrates how important the Basel III framework is to increase safety in 
the Banking sector, for instance, by emphasizing stress testing. Additionally, it describes how 
the new capital requirements imposed by Basel III will deeply strengthen the capital 
framework, when compared to the Basel II accord.  Hannoun (2010) further observes that 
“Basel III not only enhances the microprudential framework for capital, but it also adds a 
macroprudential approach that is system-wide and systemic.” (Hannoun, 2010: p. 16). On 
another hand, Gavalas (2015) analyses how the new capital requirements imposed by Basel III 
could affect the loan growth and lending rates for European commercial banks. The article’s 
approach distinguishes between banks that faced the impact of a banking crisis and those that 
did not suffer from the severe crisis consequences. The paper uses multiple regression analysis 
to estimate the appropriate amount of capital that banks should hold and the corresponding 
level of suitable loan rates. Gavalas (2015) main findings suggest that banks who have 
experienced a crisis, such as the Portuguese banks, assuming a 1.3% increase in the equity-to-
asset ratio in order to comply with Basel III requirements, will lead to a reduction of 4.97% in 
the volume of loans. The author also concludes that a 1% increase in the equity-to-asset ratio 
will contribute to a 0.05% average increase in the loan rate for banks. 
The decreasing of the credit availability and higher lending rates could severely affect the 
Portuguese credit channel, and reduce economic activity. The increase of the capital ratios that 
Portuguese banks must have could have a negative impact, considering that the provision of 
loans constitutes banks’ most important activity and the latter’s major source of revenue. In the 
same line of reasoning, Cosimano and Hakura (2011) also study how the increase in capital 
requirements will lead to higher lending rates and slower loan growth in developed countries, 
such as Portugal. Similarly, the authors also found that on large banks, the lending rates 
increase 16 basis points to achieve the Bank for International Settlements’ capital requirements. 
Furthermore, according to the author’s estimations, the increasing on the capital conservation 
buffer by 2.5 percentage points are typically expected to reduce loans by 2.5%.  
According to past literature, Lüders (2010) directly assesses the impact of Basel III on 
European banks by assuming the full implementation of Basel III requirements. They predict 
that the pre-tax Return on Equity of European banks may decrease by between 3.7 and 4.3 
percentage points from the pre-crisis level of 15%. These authors also conclude that, in 2013, 
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the Return on Equity will decline by 0.3 pp and 2.1 pp on 2016 (on average). Taking into 
consideration the possible decrease in banking profitability as previously mentioned, (Allen et 
al., 2012) make an important analysis on how to deal with the pressure of regulators to meet 
the capital requirements, while, at the same time, meet the performance expectations of the 
banks’ shareholders. In order to prove this line of argumentation, these authors design and 
implement a model considering the Basel III regulatory weights and profitability ratios, in order 
to provide a combination that maximizes the wealth of shareholders and, at the same time, 
comply with the regulatory requirements. The authors argue that this new Basel framework 
will drastically increase the difficulty of bank management, in terms of liquidity and 
accessibility of credit. The authors also state that almost all banks are compliant under Basel 
II, but only a selection of banks will be able to comply with Basel III and compliance with the 
higher capital requests. These consequences might affect the performance of the Portuguese 
banking industry and its constituents, as several authors previously demonstrated.  
With the aim of investigating the empirical results of the present Dissertation, the regression 
results will be based on Brooks (2008) and Gujarati (2011). The first author explains in a very 
theoretical way the econometric concepts from a financial perspective. While, on another hand, 
Gujarati (2011) makes very practical and detailed analysis of the outputs of econometric 
regressions. 
This research will further clarify how Portuguese banks’ performance will be impacted by the 
full implementation of Basel III. 
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4. Methodology & Data 
 
The present section analyses the empirical methodology deployed in the Dissertation, as well 
as the data used in support of the corresponding model applications. 
The present research employs the Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) model in order to analyse 
how the movements of capital requirements imposed by Basel III impact the profitability of 
the following Portuguese banks: Banco Português de Investimento, Caixa Geral de Depósitos, 
Millennium BCP, Montepio and Santander Totta. This is an established quantitative technique 
that takes into account the potential impact of multiple explanatory variables on banks’ 
profitability metrics, through the estimation of econometric regressions. The general 
econometric specification of the econometric regression is expressed by: 
• ROE 𝑖 = σ + β1 CTIER1 𝑖 + β2 TIER1 𝑖 + β3 Total Capital 𝑖 + u𝑖    (2) 
 
• ROA 𝑖 = σ + β1 CTIER1 𝑖 + β2 TIER1 𝑖 + β3 Total Capital 𝑖 + u 𝑖    (3) 
 
The ‘Return on Equity’ and ‘Return on Assets’ are the dependent variables, i.e., the variables 
that the present Dissertation wants to explain and critically analyse. On another hand, 
‘Common Equity Tier 1 Capital’, ‘Tier 1 Capital’ and ‘Total Capital’ are the independent or 
explanatory variables, the variables that can explain the outcome variable. The ‘σ’ and ‘β’ are 
parameters to be estimated and ‘u’ is the error term. 
The dependent and independent variables that will be used in the regression estimations are the 
following: 
 
Dependent Variables Independent Variables 
Return on Equity Common Equity Tier 1 
Return on Assets Total Capital 
 
Table 3 - Variables of the regression 
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Dependent Variables: 
• Return on Equity (ROE): Hull (2009) defines this concept has a measure of financial 
performance in the banking sector, which is computed by the division between the 
return expressed by the Net Income and the value of Shareholder’s Equity. 
 
                                                     ROE =
Net Income
Shareholder′s Equity
                                                (4) 
 
• Return on Assets (ROA): According to Damodaran (2017) the ROA consists on the 
Return produced by the existing assets. Basically, expresses how well banks are making 
profit from the capital that have invested. 
 
                                                      ROA =
EBIT∗(1−Tax Rate)
Total Assets
                                              (5) 
 
Independent Variables: 
• Tier 1 Capital: BIS (2005) defines this concept has the amount of regulatory capital 
that includes equity and retained earnings, and this capital must be at least 6.0% of a 
given financial institution’s Risk Weighted Assets (RWA). 
• Common Equity Tier 1: According to BIS (2005) this ratio consists of the retained 
earnings and other reserves expressed in the balance sheets of the financial institutions. 
This must be at least 4.5% of Risk Weighted Assets. 
• Total Capital: BIS (2005) defines this ratio has the Tier 1 capital plus Tier 2 Capital 
(essentially composed of subordinated debts). Must be at least 8.0% of Risk Weighted 
Assets. 
Also, the Bank for International Settlement has also imposed a capital conservation buffer in 
order to protect the banking sector against economic shocks. For the calculation of those capital 
ratios presented above, is necessary to estimate the Risk Weighted Assets. According to BIS 
(2005), “total risk-weighted assets are determined by multiplying the capital requirements for 
market risk and operational risk by 12.5 (…) and adding the resulting figures to the sum of 
15 
 
risk-weighted assets for credit risk.” (BIS, 2005: p.12). The formula of the RWA could be 
expressed by: 
• RWA = K x 12.5 x EAD                                                                                                                            (6) 
Where K stands for the ‘capital requirement’ and EAD for ‘Exposure at Default’. 
Summary statistics 
 
• Independent Variables: 
 
 Common Equity Tier 1 
 BPI Millennium BCP Montepio CGD Santander Totta 
Mean 0.100 0.086 0.089 0.087 0.108 
Standard Error 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.007 
Median 0.092 0.087 0.088 0.086 0.093 
Standard Deviation 0.033 0.027 0.013 0.019 0.031 
Sample Variance 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Kurtosis -0.411 -0.933 -1.024 -0.951 -1.138 
Skewness 0.467 0.305 0.018 -0.070 0.678 
Range 0.119 0.093 0.043 0.062 0.090 
Minimum 0.046 0.045 0.067 0.055 0.076 
Maximum 0.165 0.138 0.110 0.117 0.166 
Count 20 20 20 20 20 
 
Table 4 - Common Equity Tier 1 descriptive statistics for the different banks 
 
 Common Equity Tier 1 
 BPI Millennium BCP Montepio CGD Santander Totta 
BPI 1     
Millennium BCP 0.951 1    
Montepio 0.584 0.474 1   
CGD 0.643 0.599 0.371 1  
Santander Totta 0.467 0.513 -0.251 0.331 1 
 
Table 5 - Common Equity Tier 1 correlation matrix 
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 Tier 1 Capital 
 BPI Millennium BCP Montepio CGD Santander Totta 
Mean 0.104 0.100 0.086 0.092 0.120 
Standard Error 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.006 
Median 0.094 0.100 0.085 0.089 0.111 
Standard Deviation 0.029 0.024 0.014 0.019 0.026 
Sample Variance 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Kurtosis -0.349 -1.129 -1.271 -1.349 -1.098 
Skewness 0.674 -0.340 0.193 -0.285 0.602 
Range 0.101 0.078 0.045 0.057 0.077 
Minimum 0.061 0.055 0.065 0.060 0.089 
Maximum 0.162 0.133 0.110 0.117 0.166 
Count 20 20 20 20 20 
 
Table 6 - Tier 1 capital descriptive statistics for the different banks 
 
 Tier 1 Capital 
 BPI Millennium BCP Montepio CGD Santander Totta 
BPI 1     
Millennium BCP 0.762 1    
Montepio 0.736 0.347 1   
CGD 0.759 0.829 0.501 1  
Santander Totta 0.442 0.774 -0.047 0.611 1 
 
Table 7 - Tier 1 correlation matrix 
 
 Total Capital 
 BPI Millennium BCP Montepio CGD Santander Totta 
Mean 0.115 0.120 0.108 0.119 0.125 
Standard Error 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.005 
Median 0.111 0.119 0.109 0.123 0.113 
Standard Deviation 0.021 0.017 0.022 0.015 0.023 
Sample Variance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Kurtosis 0.174 -1.441 -1.497 0.752 -0.729 
Skewness 0.934 0.147 -0.160 -0.898 0.886 
Range 0.077 0.051 0.064 0.057 0.065 
Minimum 0.085 0.095 0.072 0.081 0.101 
Maximum 0.162 0.146 0.136 0.138 0.166 
Count 20 20 20 20 20 
 
Table 8 - Total Capital descriptive statistics for the different banks 
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 Total Capital 
 BPI Millennium BCP Montepio CGD Santander Totta 
BPI 1     
Millennium BCP 0.479 1    
Montepio 0.615 -0.146 1   
CGD 0.504 0.380 0.469 1  
Santander Totta -0.019 0.615 -0.599 -0.150 1 
 
Table 9 - Total Capital correlation matrix 
 
According to the summary statistics presented above, the standard deviation of the three (3) 
capital ratios in all banks is not very volatile against the mean. On average, Bank Santander 
Totta presents higher capital ratios, and Montepio presents the lowest ratios. Generically, where 
the Common Equity Tier 1 and Tier 1 Capital are concerned, Portuguese banks present a lower 
kurtosis, which means that there are few dispersed observations against the normal distribution. 
The skewness is negative in the three (3) capital ratios for Caixa Geral de Depósitos, which 
means that the observation accumulates on the peak’s left side. On average, Millennium BCP 
presented some difficulties in compliance with the Common Equity Tier 1 and Tier 1 Capital 
requirements. Through the correlation table, it is noteworthy to observe that the strong positive 
correlation on Tier 1 Capital and Common Equity Tier 1 Capital between Millennium BCP and 
BPI. This reflects the fact that, for instance, if the Common Equity Tier 1 of Millennium BCP 
increases, the Common Equity Tier 1 of the bank BPI will move in the same direction and vice-
versa.  
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• Dependent variables: 
 Return on Assets 
 BPI Millennium BCP Montepio CGD Santander Totta 
Mean 0.003 -0,001 -0,001 0,000 0,007 
Standard Error 0.001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 
Median 0.002 0,001 0,000 0,001 0,005 
Standard Deviation 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.004 
Sample Variance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Kurtosis 0.799 0.341 1.649 6.150 -1.752 
Skewness -0.701 -1.007 -1.585 -1.655 0.119 
Range 0.015 0.020 0.016 0.029 0.012 
Minimum -0.007 -0.014 -0.013 -0.020 0.001 
Maximum 0.009 0.006 0.003 0.010 0.013 
Count 20 20 20 20 20 
 
Table 10 - Return on Assets (ROA) descriptive statistics for the different banks 
 
 Return on Equity 
 BPI Millennium BCP Montepio CGD Santander Totta 
Mean 0.050 -0.033 -0.018 -0.010 0.098 
Standard Error 0.017 0.025 0.016 0.030 0.015 
Median 0.051 0.015 0.006 0.011 0.083 
Standard Deviation 0.076 0.110 0.071 0.132 0.068 
Sample Variance 0.006 0.012 0.005 0.017 0.005 
Kurtosis 1.714 0.665 1.298 8.634 -1.552 
Skewness -0.295 -1.177 -1.489 -2.265 0.289 
Range 0.363 0.427 0.233 0.665 0.204 
Minimum -0.138 -0.305 -0.181 -0.479 0.012 
Maximum 0.225 0.122 0.052 0.186 0.216 
Count 20 20 20 20 20 
 
Table 11 - Return on Equity (ROE) descriptive statistics for the different banks 
According to the summary statistics on the Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets 
(ROA), on average, BPI and Santander Totta are more profitable, having, on both ratios, a 
positive performance during the time window of this study (2007 to 2016). Caixa Geral de 
Depósitos is the bank that presents the highest volatility regarding the ROE and ROA indicators 
against their corresponding means. Also, Caixa Geral de Depósitos is the only bank that 
demonstrates a kurtosis much higher than 3, revealing that the sample has several extreme 
values. There is a high probability that Santander Totta presents a right-skewed distribution 
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and the other banks present a left-skewed distribution for both profitability ratios. Bank 
Santander Totta offers the highest return on assets and BPI the highest return on equity.  
Data Source 
 
Variables Time Window Source 
Return on Equity 2007 - 2016 Associação Portuguesa de Bancos (APB) 
Return on Assets 2007 - 2016 Associação Portuguesa de Bancos (APB) 
Common Equity Tier 1 2007 - 2016 Thomson Reuters; Semestral Financial Reports 
Tier 1 capital 2007 - 2016 Thomson Reuters; Semestral Financial Reports 
Total Capital 2007 - 2016 Thomson Reuters; Semestral Financial Reports 
 
Table 12 - Source and time window of the variables used in this study 
 
Table 12 (above-presented) provides information related to the source of the five (5) variables 
that have been used to study how the new capital requirements imposed by Basel III could 
affect the performance/profitability of Portuguese banks. Our Dissertation’s sample comprises 
the following Portuguese banks:  Banco Português de Investimento, Caixa Geral de Depósitos, 
Millennium BCP, Montepio and Santander Totta. The time window adopted in this research is 
between 2007 and 2016, as this time frame is the most suitable window to study the effects of 
Basel III capital requirements, taking into account that the said BASEL III framework was 
developed in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, as a measure intended 
to strength banks’ capital requirements, and in order to avoid the onset of future financial crises. 
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5. Empirical Findings  
 
According to the European Parliament (2013), the Directive 2013/36/EU has implemented the 
new capital requirements framework to all financial institutions, the Capital Requirement 
Directive (CRD) IV, that consists on the Basel III framework. Those new capital requirements 
that the European banks must comply with consist of a gradual process of increasing banking 
capital until the full implementation of Basel III in 2019. The next table presents the Basel III 
phase-in arrangements:  
 Basel III phase-in arrangements 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Common Equity Tier 1 + 
Conservation Buffer 
3.50% 4.00% 4.50% 5.125% 5.75% 6.375% 7.00% 
Tier 1 Capital 4.50% 5.50% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 
Total Capital + 
Conservation Buffer 
8.00% 8.00% 8.00% 8.625% 9.25% 9.875% 10.50% 
 
Table 13 - Capital Reforms implementation timetable imposed by Bank for International Settlements 
Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014) 
 
This timely increase of banks’ capital requirements is very important for the financial 
institutions to avoid abrupt changes in their activities. Also, it is vital to prevent a huge shock 
in banks’ performance derived from the sudden increasing of capital on their balance sheets, 
and also by the sharp decrease on the credit channel.  
With the aim of studying the relationship between the Core Tier 1, Tier 1, the Total Capital, 
and the Return on Equity, and Return on Assets of the Portuguese banks, some regressions 
addressing BASEL III’s impact on Portuguese banks’ have been estimated. The data for these 
variables were taken from the half-yearly financial reports of the five (5) most important 
Portuguese banks. The data range from 2007 up until 2016. The behaviour of the variables 
under study (ROE and ROA), the outcome/dependent variables, are explained by a function 
that contains independent variables. The regression estimations are linear functions of the 
independent variables and they were used in the following regression specifications, presented 
previously in the methodology and data chapter: 
• ROE 𝑖 = σ + β1 CTIER1 𝑖 + β2 TIER1 𝑖 + β3 Total Capital 𝑖 + u 𝑖                            (7)                                                              
 
• ROA 𝑖 = σ + β1 CTIER1 𝑖 + β2 TIER1 𝑖 + β3 Total Capital 𝑖 + u 𝑖                           (8)                                                      
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After the regressions have been estimated, the most significant variables are maintained and 
the ones which were not so significant were excluded from the final results. That is, the present 
research design follows a two-step approach in the econometric estimations. The regressions 
with the variables that have been excluded are expressed in the appendix. The only exception 
is Caixa Geral de Depósitos in which the regression results were maintained although the 
variables were not statistically significant. Also, some graphs were computed to demonstrate 
the relationship between the dependent variable and the most significant independent variable 
for each bank. The graphs for the remaining variables are expressed in the appendix. 
Millennium BCP 
Banco Comercial Português, S.A. (Millennium BCP), is considered Portugal’s largest private 
bank when it comes to market share, having more than 2.3 million customers in multiple 
geographies. Founded in 1985 mainly due to the subtraction of regulations and expansion of 
the financial system the bank has nowadays approximately 15,000 employees and 1,000 
branches. Starting with Millennium BCP, the following regressions were estimated: 
• Millennium BCP Return on Assets = σ + β1 Common Equity Tier 1 Capital 𝑖 + β2   
Tier 1 Capital 𝑖 + u 𝑖                                                                                                    (9)                                                                                                
• Millennium BCP Return on Equity = σ + β1 Common Equity Tier 1 Capital 𝑖 + β2 
Tier 1 Capital 𝑖 + u 𝑖                                                                                                  (10) 
The outputs of the previous regressions are (respectively): 
   Regression Statistics   
   Multiple R 0.801   
   R Square 0.642   
   Adj. R Square 0.600   
   Standard Error 0.003   
   F-test 0.000   
   BP test  0.405   
   Ramsey test 0.387   
   Observations 20   
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 0.01 0.003 2.569 0.020 0.001 0.015 
CTIER1 -0.21 0.048 -4.346 0.000 -0.312 -0.108 
TIER1 0.09 0.054 1.623 0.123 -0.026 0.203 
 
Table 14 - Regression (9) between ROA, Common Equity Tier 1, and Tier 1 capital for Millennium BCP 
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   Regression Statistics   
   Multiple R 0.837   
   R Square 0.701   
   Adj. R Square 0.666   
   Standard Error 0.064   
   F-Test 0.000   
   BP test  0.359   
   Ramsey test 0.302   
   Observations 20   
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 0.160 0.062 2.566 0.020 0.029 0.292 
CTIER1 -4.822 0.942 -5.122 0.000 -6.809 -2.836 
TIER1 2.217 1.056 2.100 0.051 -0.011 4.445 
 
Table 15 - Regression (10) between ROE, Common Equity Tier 1, and Tier 1 capital for Millennium BCP 
 
Those regressions provide the following equations:  
• Millennium BCP ROA = 0.01 – 0.21 Common Tier 1 Capital+ 0.09 Tier 1 Capital    (11) 
• Millennium BCP ROE = 0.16 – 4.82 Common Tier 1 Capital+ 2.22 Tier 1 Capital     (12) 
 
According to Gujarati (2011), the “σ” is the intercept and the “β”s are defined as the slope 
coefficients, in this case, the slope of CTIER1 and TIER1. Jointly, they constitute the 
regression parameters. According to the regression output of table 2, the average expected 
value of the Return on Equity is 0.01, and this value is reached by matching the independent 
variables to zero. Also, it is possible to observe that, all else being constant, an increase of one 
percent in Common Equity Tier 1, would change, on average, the ROA of Millennium by -
0.21% and -4.82% for the ROE. On another hand, if the Tier 1 capital increases by one percent, 
on average, the Return on Assets will increase by 0.09% and the Return on Equity by 2.2%. It 
means that TIER 1 has a positive impact on the ROE and ROA. On another hand, CTIER1 has 
a negative impact on the profitability of Millennium BCP. In order to analyse the statistical 
significance of the independent variables, some statistical tests will be taken into account. 
Brooks (2008) defines the t-statistic as the ratio of the coefficient to its standard error, and it is 
very useful to compare with the corresponding critical value. The critical value is considered 
to be -1.96 and 1.96 from a t-distribution and the main goal consist in analysing whether the 
null hypotheses will be rejected (significant) or not (not significant). According to the output 
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of the regression of table 2 and 3, the coefficient CTIER1 is statistically significant because the 
t-stat is higher than 1.96 and in this case, lower than -1.96. The other statistical test is the P-
value. Brooks (2008) defends that “it gives the marginal significance level where one would 
be indifferent between rejecting and not rejecting the null hypothesis.” (Brooks, 2008: p.74). 
Assuming a significance level of 0.05%, for a confidence interval of 95%, both CTIER1 
variables are statistically significant. In the specific case of Millennium BCP, it means that 
there is a relation concerning the behaviour between CTIER1 with the ROE and ROA. 
Following Gujarati (2011) regarding the interpretation of the confidence interval, it is possible 
to state that there is a 95% probability that the impact of an additional unit of CTIER1 on the 
ROA will be at least -0.31 and -0.11 units at the most.  
The estimation produces a good fit, insofar as, according to the R-Squared, approximately 64% 
of the movements on the ROA of Millennium BCP are explained by the variables of the 
estimated regression and the chosen independent variables, which also explain 70% of the 
movements of the ROE. From the following Figure it is possible to analyse the behaviour of 
the regression observations: 
 
Figure 4 - Scatter plot between Millennium BCP ROE and CTIER1 
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Through the observation of the figure 4 above, it is possible to conclude that the independent 
variables were able to explain the dependent variable since most of the observations are close 
to the regression line (fitted values). The Standard errors of this regression are very low, 
meaning that the values of the ROE and ROA over the 10 years of the study do not present 
strongly diverging values from the mean. More importantly, the figure also expresses the 
negative trend of the ROE in relation to progressive increases of CTIER1. 
It is also important to analyse some relevant statistical tests, for instance, the F-test, Breusch-
Pagan and Ramsey test. Starting with the F-test, the test results associated with regression (11) 
and (12) above mentioned, are respectively 0.02% and 0%, meaning that the estimation is 
globally well estimated, and it is representative of the population. In terms of autocorrelation 
tests, the Breusch-Pagan test for both regressions was computed. Regressions (11) and (12) test 
results were 40.48% and 35.88%, meaning that there are no heteroscedasticity issues. Taking 
into account the Ramsey test, according to Gujarati (2011) to detect if the model is omitting 
some relevant variables, it is possible to conclude through the test results, 38.74% and 30.15% 
respectively, that the model is correctly specified. 
Banco Português de Investimento (BPI) 
Banco Português de Investimento S.A. (BPI) is “the fifth largest financial institution operating 
in Portugal in terms of assets (…) with market shares of 9.2% in loans and 10.7% in customer 
resources ” (BPI, 2017). The bank was founded in 1981 and its core business area is Retail 
Banking and Commercial Banking. Roughly 85% of BPI’s stake is held by CaixaBank Group. 
BPI total assets raised in June 2017 to an amount of 32,751 Million euros. 
Considering the regression output of BPI: 
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   Regression Statistics   
   Multiple R 0.478   
   R Square 0.229   
   Adj. R Square 0.138   
   Standard Error 0.071   
   F-test 0.110   
   BP test  0.178   
   Ramsey test 0.152   
   Observations 20   
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept -0.176 0.119 -1.480 0.157 -0.426 0.075 
CTIER1 -12.237 5.449 -2.246 0.038 -23.734 -0.740 
TIER1 14.005 6.279 2.230 0.039 0.757 27.253 
 
Table 16 - Regression (13) between ROE, Common Equity Tier 1, and Tier 1 capital for Banco Português de 
Investimento 
 
This output provides the next equation:  
• BPI Return on Equity = -0.18 – 12.24 Common Equity Tier 1 + 14.01 Tier 1         (13) 
According to the above-mentioned estimation all of the independent variables are statistically 
significant for a 95% confidence interval. Also, the independent variables create the same 
impact on BPI as the corresponding impact verified in Millenium BCP, more specifically the 
fact that CTIER1 has a negative impact on ROE and TIER1 a positive impact on ROE. It is 
important to observe that the R-squared is low, and on this specific regression, the observations 
of this sample are not so close to the regression line (fitted values) as the previous. Also, the 
inclination of the line expressing the fitted values is not so steep comparing with Millennium 
BCP: 
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Figure 5 - Scatter plot between BPI ROE and TIER1 
According to F-test, regression (13) presents a result of 10.97%, meaning that this estimation 
is a borderline case of good fit for a Confidence Interval of 90%. Regarding the presence of 
autocorrelation, the BP test was computed. The corresponding test result was 17.82%, stating 
that there is no issue with heteroscedasticity, the error has the same variance given any value 
of the explanatory variables. Also, there are no omitted variables in the current model because 
the Ramsey test presented a value of 15.15%. 
Santander Totta 
Banco Santander Totta S.A. (Santander Totta), founded in 1988, is now one of the largest 
private banks in Portugal. In the third quarter of 2017, the bank announced gross loans of 31 
thousand million euros, 15.4% market share, customer funds of 37.9 thousand million euros 
and deposit’s market share of 13.7% (Aug. 2017). Currently, the bank has almost 600 branches 
and over 6,000 employees. 
 
Concerning Santander Totta, presently one of the biggest privately-owned banks in Portugal, 
the following regression output was estimated: 
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   Regression Statistics   
   Multiple R 0.677   
   R Square 0.458   
   Adj. R Square 0.394   
   Standard Error 0.053   
   F-test 0.006   
   BP test  0.426   
   Ramsey test 0.380   
   Observations 20   
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 0.131 0.069 1.897 0.075 -0.015 0.276 
CTIER1 -2.266 0.630 -3.598 0.002 -3.596 -0.937 
Total Capital 1.707 0.843 2.025 0.059 -0.071 3.485 
 
Table 17 - Regression (14) between ROE and Common Equity Tier 1 and Total capital for Santander Totta 
 
This output provides the next equation:  
• Santander Totta ROE = 0.13 – 2.27 Common Tier 1 Capital + 1.71 Total Capital  (14)                                                                                                                                    
On this regression for Santander Totta is important to observe that Total Capital is one of the 
independent variables that helps explain the ROE of Santander. This variable is statistically 
significant for a significance level of 10%. The following figure 6 expresses the behaviour of 
CTIER1 on the Santander Totta ROE: 
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Figure 6 - Scatter plot between Santander Totta ROE and CTIER1 
 
Through the corresponding output, it is also possible to verify the positive contribution that 
Total Capital has on this profitability ratio. The CTIER1 continues to be very significant, 
however it does not have such a negative impact on ROE comparing with the other Portuguese 
banks.   
Regarding the F-test for regression (14), the test result presented a value of 0.55%, 
demonstrating how well the current model is representative of the population. In terms of 
autocorrelation, the BP test was computed, and the test result is 42.61%. To support the 
previous results, the Ramsey test for regression (14) is 37.95%, a very significant result, 
expressing that the equation is correctly specified.  
Montepio 
Caixa Económica Montepio Geral S.A. (Montepio) was founded in 1844 and is considered to 
be a savings bank with its core business in Retail Banking. The bank has a thousand million 
euros in total assets, gross loans to customers of about 15 thousand million, and customer funds 
of 12 thousand million euros, as presented in its 2016 Report and Accounts 21. Finally, it’s 
network has more than 450 branches and 3.800 employees. 
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Considering the regression (15) output of Montepio, it should be observed that this bank has 
the lowest market share comparing with the other 4 banks of the study in terms of credit, 
deposits and assets.  
 
   Regression Statistics   
   Multiple R 0.570   
   R Square 0.325   
   Adj. R Square 0.246   
   Standard Error 0.061   
   F-test 0.035   
   BP test  0.003   
   Ramsey test 0.084   
   Observations 20   
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept -0.040 0.087 -0.457 0.653 -0.223 0.144 
TIER1 -4.094 1.871 -2.188 0.043 -8.041 -0.146 
Total Capital 3.438 1.212 2.836 0.011 0.881 5.996 
 
Table 18 - Regression (15) between ROE, Tier 1, and Total capital for Montepio 
 
This output provides the next equation:  
• Montepio ROE = -0.04 – 4.09 Tier 1 Capital+ 3.44 Total Capital                                    (15) 
It is important to note a quite different performance of TIER1 on Montepio’s Return on Equity, 
when comparing with the previously presented results associated with Millennium BCP and 
BPI. In this case, TIER1 has a strong negative impact on banks profitability. Both independent 
variables are statistically significant for a significance level of 5%, and the Total Capital is 
almost significant for a significance level of 1%. 
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Figure 7 - Scatter plot between Montepio ROE and Total Capital 
 
Concerning the F-test for regression (15), the test result is 3.52%. It is possible to conclude that 
the model is representative of the population. In relation to the autocorrelation test, it was 
obtained a result of 0.25% meaning that, the errors are heteroskedastic. The Ramsey test has a 
value of 8.35%, it is possible to conclude, for a significance level of 5%, no omission of 
relevant variables impacted the ROE of Montepio. 
Caixa Geral de Depósitos 
Caixa Geral de Depósitos S.A. (CGD), was created by Carta de Lei in 1876, during the reign 
of King Luís. Nowadays, it has approximately 16,000 employees and operates in over 1,200 
branches. According to Bloomberg (2017), the main areas of CGD activity are Retail Banking, 
Commercial Banking, Corporate Finance and Asset Management. When it comes to assets, 
CGD is Portugal’s largest bank as they stood at 99.36 thousand million euros in June 2016.  
Finally, Caixa Geral de Depósitos, the biggest bank in Portugal with a market share higher than 
25% in terms of deposits, loans and assets, presents the following regressions output: 
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   Regression Statistics   
   Multiple R 0.381   
   R Square 0.145   
   Adj. R Square 0.045   
   Standard Error 0.006   
   F-test 0.264   
   BP test  0.000   
   Ramsey test 0.150   
   Observations 20   
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 0.005 0.006 0.744 0.467 -0.009 0.018 
CTIER1 0.207 0.150 1.382 0.185 -0.109 0.524 
TIER1 -0.254 0.151 -1.681 0.111 -0.573 0.065 
 
Table 19 - Regression between ROA, Common Equity Tier 1, and Tier 1 Capital for Caixa Geral de Depósitos 
 
   Regression Statistics   
   Multiple R 0.384   
   R Square 0.147   
   Adj. R Square 0.047   
   Standard Error 0.129   
   F-test 0.258   
   BP test  0.000   
   Ramsey test 0.302   
   Observations 20   
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 0.087 0.146 0.596 0.559 -0.220 0.394 
CTIER1 5.035 3.373 1.493 0.154 -2.081 12.151 
TIER1 -5.823 3.401 -1.712 0.105 -12.998 1.352 
 
Table 20 - Regression between ROE, Common Equity Tier 1, and Tier 1 Capital for Caixa Geral de Depósitos 
These outputs provide the next equations:  
• CGD Return on Assets = 0.005 + 0.21 Common Tier 1 Capital – 0.25 Tier 1                 (16) 
• CGD Return on Equity = 0.087 + 5.04 Common Tier 1 Capital – 5.82 Tier 1                 (17) 
Scrutinising the results of both regressions, what draws immediately to attention are the 
opposite trends of the results founded in the previous regressions, concerning the performance 
of the independent variables. As is possible to note through the observation of the regression 
output associated with Caixa’s estimation, the positive impact of CTIER1 and the negative 
impact of TIER1 (considering ROE as the dependent variable): 
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Figure 8 - Scatter plot between CGD ROE and CTIER1 
 
Figure 9 - Scatter plot between CGD ROE and TIER1 
However, none of the variables are statistically significant and could not explain properly the 
ROA and ROE respectively. Another finding consists in the fact that, these two variables, in 
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addition to not being statistically significant, do not explain the movements of ROA and ROE, 
because the R-squared of both regressions are 14.5% and 14.7% respectively. That is, their 
explanatory power is somewhat limited. 
According to very relevant statistical tests, for instance, the F-test, Breusch-Pagan and Ramsey 
test, those results were performed in order to understand if the model fits and properly explains 
the population. Considering the results of the F-test, of regression (16) and (17) above 
mentioned, are respectively 26.35% and 25.81%, meaning that the estimation is not well 
estimated comparing with the previous regressions of the other Portuguese banks. In terms of 
autocorrelation tests, the Breusch-Pagan test was computed for regressions (16) and (17), and 
the results were 0.03% and 0.01%, grounding the idea of heteroscedasticity issues. The Ramsey 
test presents the following results, 14.97% and 30.15% respectively, demonstrating that the no 
omission of relevant variables is present in the estimations. 
To conclude, through the estimation of the above-mentioned regressions, it is possible to collect 
some relevant empirical results in relation to the impact of capital ratios on the profitability of 
Portuguese banks.  
The first overall finding suggests that there is a negative relationship between CTIER1 and 
ROE for BPI, BCP and Santander Totta, as they present a high degree of significance for this 
variable (close to 1% of significance). This variable also has an important feature, because it 
has a very significant impact on the bank’s profitability, taking into consideration the high 
levels of the coefficient relative to this variable. Second, for the same three (3) banks previously 
described, the TIER1 contributes to the increase of profitability. Third, for Montepio and 
Santander Totta, the obtained significant results associated with the independent variable Total 
Capital may demonstrate that in Portugal, this ratio contributes positively to the ROE. Fourth, 
regarding the independent variables, the CTIER1 has coefficients with higher magnitude 
comparing with TIER1 in most of the Portuguese banks, and TIER1 presents higher 
coefficients in comparison with Total Capital. 
These empirical findings allow us to conclude that these three main capital requirements 
imposed by Bank for International Settlements will have a significant impact on the 
profitability of major Portuguese banks, as depicted by the estimated equations. The described 
findings are at the origin of a very important question: How have these new capital 
requirements affected/impacted Portuguese banking activities and, subsequently, banks’ 
profitability since the Global Financial Crisis? 
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According to APB (2015), the historical levels of bank capital have always stood above the 
legal minimums required. However, since 2008, Tier 1 Capital and Total Capital of Portuguese 
banks have lower values comparing with the average of European Union 27. Nevertheless, the 
obligation to progressively increase the levels of bank capital affects the credit channel of 
Portuguese banks. Bonfim (2013) states that the credit channel “encompasses two different 
transmission mechanisms: the bank lending channel and the balance sheet channel.” (Bonfim, 
2013: p.89). With the increasing of capital requirements, as depicted through Table 1, 
Portuguese banks will have more capital in their balance sheets and the credit channel will 
progressively decrease until 2019 (until the full implementation of Basel III takes place). 
Bonfim (2013) also found that the Portuguese banks, mainly the smaller ones, provide more 
loans to riskier borrowers, with higher probabilities of default, when the overall level of interest 
rates is low. This research also concludes that there is a “risk-taking channel in Portugal”. 
(Bonfim, 2013: p. 102). One of the main problems in the Portuguese banking sector that 
contributes to the lack of profitability is the increase of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs), as 
verified since the beginning of the Global Financial Crisis. 
 
Figure 10 - Non-Performing Loans to Total gross loans 
Source: Federal Reserve Economic Data (2017) 
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The figure above demonstrates the growth of the ratio between defaulted loans (when 
borrowers are more than 90 days into non-compliance with their obligations) and the total gross 
loans for USA, Germany, Portugal, and Italy. In the beginning of the GFC, the USA banking 
sector had a peak on the loan defaults series; however, two years later the U.S. banking industry 
was able to stabilize this crisis trend in the banking sector. Regarding one of the most developed 
economies in Europe, Germany was mildly affected by the contagion process associated with 
the propagation of the financial shock across financial institutions. However, the same did not 
happen to Portugal, as the series reveals that, from 2005 to 2015, the value of NPL’s increased 
sharply (expressed as non-performing loans to total gross loans). In fact, this increase is 
massive, at the value increased by 635%. According to KPMG (2017), the NPLs consume 
banks’ capital, increase the running costs of the corresponding banks, while also having a huge 
impact on the corresponding profitability, which could, eventually, even compromise the 
sustainability of the Portuguese banking sector. It is possible to conclude that the NPLs are one 
of the main drivers of the decrease of Portuguese banks’ profitability. KPMG (2016), suggest 
that there are 5 key drivers of bank profitability. The net interest margins, cost of income ratios, 
the business model of the bank, the non-performing loans that increase banks’ provisions (and 
consequently decreases profitability), and, finally, the regulatory reform that increases the 
capital requirements. Following this line of reasoning, Portuguese banks inevitably had to 
comply with this effort of increasing their corresponding capital requirements, especially in 
periods of financial distress, when they need significant amounts of bank capital in order to 
carry out their banking activities in the face of financial distress episodes. In sum, the present 
section of the Dissertation concludes that the new capital requirements imposed by Basel III 
framework have a negative impact on the profitability of Portuguese banks. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The academic research question associated with the present Dissertation addresses how the 
new capital requirements imposed by Basel III could affect the profitability of the Portuguese 
banks, more precisely, the Return on Equity and Return on Assets. According to KPMG (2016), 
the regulatory reforms are one of the main drivers of profitability in the European Union 
banking system. It is crucial to estimate what is the impact that Tier 1 Capital, Common Equity 
Tier 1 Capital and Total Capital have on banking activity, mainly on the cost of funding, and 
how it could impact banks’ profitability. Regarding the existing academic research question, it 
basically focused on providing an overview of the Portuguese banking system, by estimating 
the concentration levels on Deposits, Credit and Assets. The Dissertation further provides an 
explanation as to why Basel III framework was implemented, and what are the main goals 
associated with this implementation.  
In the present Dissertation, the Multiple Regression analysis, was deployed, using the Return 
on Assets and Return on Equity as the dependent variables, and Common Equity Tier 1 Capital, 
Tier 1 Capital and Total Capital as the independent variables. In order to analyse the output of 
the regressions, several econometric tests were performed in order to safeguard the quality of 
the findings. The data used were taken from the consolidated reports of the five (5) Portuguese 
financial institutions since 2007 until 2016.  
As described in the empirical findings chapter, four (4) stylised facts can be drawn from the 
estimated regressions. The first and most important fact suggests that there is a high degree of 
significance, very close to 1%, in the coefficients referring to the negative relationship between 
Common Equity Tier 1 and ROE for Banco Português de Investimento, Millennium BCP and 
Santander Totta. This is a crucial finding in order to understand the performance of bank 
profitability to increasing capital requirements, in this case, the Common Equity Tier 1. This 
capital ratio (Common Equity Tier 1 to Risk Weighted Assets) has the strongest impact on 
bank profitability and is the main capital ratio. Second, for the same three (3) banks previously 
mentioned, the Tier 1 contributes to the growth of profitability. Third, for Santader Totta and 
Montepio, the results of both regressions, considering Total Capital as the independent 
variable, clearly demonstrate that this capital ratio contributes positively to the Return on 
Equity. Fourth, concerning the independent variable Common Equity Tier 1, it presents 
coefficients with higher magnitude, when compared to the corresponding coefficients 
associated with Tier 1 Capital and Total Capital in most of the Portuguese banks. Another 
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important fact addressed in the present Dissertation is the growth of Non-Performing Loans 
and the credit channel in the Portuguese banking system.  
One of the biggest advantages of this Dissertation is related to the quality of the empirical 
findings. There is a lack of empirical literature regarding this topic and even less about the 
performance of Portuguese banks under Basel III. The main limitation of the present 
Dissertation consists on the adopted time window for the study, which does not include the full 
business cycle (covering the recession and expansion periods) due to data constraints. 
However, the main purpose of the research is to analyse the period of the recession, during and 
after the financial crisis. Although the Dissertation could also have incorporated more banks, 
however, considering the several recapitalizations and resolutions, a decision was taken to 
focus on the quality of the sample. 
In terms of suggestions for future research addressing this topic of Basel III, regulation and the 
Portuguese banking system, it would be interesting to study how Non-Performing Loans affect 
the performance and profitability of Portuguese banks. This is an important topic, taking into 
account the huge losses in the Portuguese banking industry due to the increase impairments in 
the aftermath of the economic and financial crises.  
The present Dissertation therefore reflects ongoing concerns that financial institutions should 
thus focus on their risk management activities. According to a statement made by a previous 
chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, “indeed, better risk management may be the 
only truly necessary element of success in banking” (Greenspan, 2004: p.89). 
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Appendices 
 
 
Figure 11 - Scatter plot between Millennium BCP ROA and CTIER1 
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Figure 12 - Scatter plot between Millennium BCP ROA and TIER1 
 
 
Figure 13 - Scatter plot between Millennium BCP ROE and TIER1 
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Figure 14 - Scatter plot between BPI ROE and CTIER1 
 
 
Figure 15 - Scatter plot between Santander Totta ROE and Total Capital 
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Figure 16 - Scatter plot between Montepio ROE and TIER1 
 
Figure 17 - Scatter plot between CGD ROA and CTIER1 
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Figure 18 - Scatter plot between CGD ROA and TIER1 
 
 
 
 
Non Performing Loans to Total Gross Loans (%) 
Year USA Portugal Germany Italy 
2005 0.70% 1.50% 4.90% 5.30% 
2006 0.80% 1.50% 4.10% 6.60% 
2007 1.40% 2.80% 3.40% 5.80% 
2008 3.00% 3.60% 2.70% 6.30% 
2009 5.00% 4.80% 2.90% 9.40% 
2010 4.40% 5.20% 3.30% 10.00% 
2011 3.80% 7.50% 3.20% 11.70% 
2012 3.30% 9.80% 3.00% 13.80% 
2013 2.50% 10.70% 2.90% 16.50% 
2014 1.90% 11.90% 2.70% 18.00% 
2015 1.50% 11.90% 2.30% 18.00% 
 
Table 21 - Non-Performing Loans to Total gross loans 
Source: Federal Reserve Economic Data (2017) 
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   Regression Statistics   
   Multiple R 0.818   
   R Square 0.669   
   Adj. R Square 0.608   
   Standard Error 0.003   
   Observations 20   
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 0.003 0.006 0.463 0.650 -0.010 0.015 
CTIER1 -0.209 0.048 -4.360 0.000 -0.311 -0.107 
TIER1 0.029 0.074 0.399 0.695 -0.127 0.186 
Total Capital 0.095 0.082 1.152 0.266 -0.080 0.269 
 
Table 22 - Regression between ROA, Common Equity Tier 1, Tier 1, and Total Capital for Millennium BCP 
 
 
   Regression Statistics   
   Multiple R 0.849   
   R Square 0.720   
   Adj. R Square 0.668   
   Standard Error 0.064   
   Observations 20   
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 0.061 0.113 0.539 0.597 -0.179 0.301 
CTIER1 -4.799 0.939 -5.111 0.000 -6.790 -2.809 
TIER1 1.174 1.449 0.810 0.430 -1.898 4.246 
Total Capital 1.688 1.611 1.048 0.310 -1.727 5.104 
 
Table 23 - Regression between ROE, Common Equity Tier 1, Tier 1, and Total Capital for Millennium BCP 
 
   Regression Statistics   
   Multiple R 0.583   
   R Square 0.340   
   Adj. R Square 0.216   
   Standard Error 0.003   
   Observations 20   
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept -0.009 0.006 -1.654 0.118 -0.021 0.003 
CTIER1 -0.743 0.369 -2.013 0.061 -1.526 0.040 
TIER1 0.843 0.485 1.738 0.101 -0.185 1.871 
Total Capital -0.009 0.120 -0.072 0.944 -0.262 0.245 
 
Table 24 - Regression between ROA, Common Equity Tier 1, Tier 1, and Total Capital for BPI 
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   Regression Statistics   
   Multiple R 0.478   
   R Square 0.229   
   Adj. R Square 0.084   
   Standard Error 0.073   
   Observations 20   
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept -0.176 0.123 -1.430 0.172 -0.437 0.085 
CTIER1 -12.217 8.040 -1.519 0.148 -29.262 4.828 
TIER1 13.976 10.557 1.324 0.204 -8.405 36.356 
Total 
Capital 0.009 2.604 0.004 0.997 -5.511 5.530 
 
Table 25 - Regression between ROE, Common Equity Tier 1, Tier 1, and Total Capital for BPI 
 
   Regression Statistics   
   Multiple R 0.658   
   R Square 0.434   
   Adj. R Square 0.327   
   Standard Error 0.004   
   Observations 20   
 Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 0.008 0.005 1.405 0.179 -0.004 0.019 
CTIER1 -0.070 0.118 -0.593 0.561 -0.320 0.180 
Total Capital 0.158 0.067 2.361 0.031 0.016 0.300 
TIER1 -0.110 0.158 -0.693 0.498 -0.445 0.226 
 
Table 26 - Regression between ROA, Common Equity Tier 1, Tier 1, and Total Capital for Santander Totta 
 
   Regression Statistics   
   Multiple R 0,690   
   R Square 0,476   
   Adj. R Square 0,378   
   Standard Error 0,054   
   Observations 20   
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 0.161 0.081 1.992 0.064 -0.010 0.332 
CTIER1 -1.055 1.752 -0.602 0.555 -4.770 2.659 
Total Capital 2.085 0.994 2.096 0.052 -0.023 4.193 
TIER1 -1.742 2.347 -0.742 0.469 -6.718 3.234 
 
Table 27 - Regression between ROE, Common Equity Tier 1, Tier 1, and Total Capital for Santander Totta 
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   Regression Statistics   
   Multiple R 0.558   
   R Square 0.311   
   Adj. R Square 0.182   
   Standard Error 0.004   
   Observations 20   
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept -0.004 0.007 -0.512 0.616 -0.019 0.012 
CTIER1 0.090 0.213 0.422 0.679 -0.362 0.542 
TIER1 -0.318 0.174 -1.832 0.086 -0.687 0.050 
Total 
Capital 0.199 0.092 2.163 0.046 0.004 0.394 
 
Table 28 - Regression between ROA, Common Equity Tier 1, Tier 1, and Total Capital for Montepio 
 
   Regression Statistics   
   Multiple R 0.576   
   R Square 0.332   
   Adj. R Square 0.207   
   Standard Error 0.063   
   Observations 20   
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept -0.065 0109 -0.597 0.559 -0.296 0.166 
CTIER1 1.312 3.240 0.405 0.691 -5.555 8.180 
TIER1 -4.827 2.638 -1.830 0.086 -10.421 0.766 
Total Capital 3.180 1.397 2.276 0.037 0.218 6.142 
 
Table 29 - Regression between ROE, Common Equity Tier 1, Tier 1, and Total Capital for Montepio 
 
   Regression Statistics   
   Multiple R 0.383   
   R Square 0.146   
   Adj. R Square -0.014   
   Standard Error 0.006   
   Observations 20   
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 0.005 0.008 0.711 0.487 -0.011 0.021 
CTIER1 0.211 0.156 1.350 0.196 -0.120 0.541 
TIER1 -0.261 0.162 -1.609 0.127 -0.605 0.083 
Total Capital -0.001 0.007 -0.153 0.880 -0.017 0.015 
 
Table 30 - Regression between ROA, Common Equity Tier 1, Tier 1, and Total Capital for CGD 
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   Regression Statistics   
   Multiple R 0.478   
   R Square 0.229   
   Adj. R Square 0.084   
   Standard Error 0.126   
   Observations 20   
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept -0.011 0.161 -0.066 0.948 -0.352 0.331 
CTIER1 4.427 3.339 1.326 0.204 -2.651 11.505 
TIER1 -4.556 3.473 -1.312 0.208 -11.918 2.805 
Total 
Capital 0.209 0.161 1.302 0.212 -0.131 0.549 
 
Table 31 - Regression between ROE, Common Equity Tier 1, Tier 1, and Total Capital for CGD 
 
 
